<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Security on Unbound Force</title><link>https://unboundforce.dev/tags/security/</link><description>Recent content in Security on Unbound Force</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-US</language><copyright>Copyright (c) 2025-2026 Unbound Force</copyright><lastBuildDate>Sun, 03 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://unboundforce.dev/tags/security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Stop Leaking Cloud Credentials to Your AI Containers — uf gateway Credential Isolation</title><link>https://unboundforce.dev/blog/gateway-credentials/</link><pubDate>Sun, 03 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://unboundforce.dev/blog/gateway-credentials/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="the-problem"&gt;The Problem&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Running AI agents in containers requires LLM API access. The agent needs to call Claude, but the cloud credentials — Google Cloud OAuth tokens, AWS session credentials, Anthropic API keys — live on the host machine. Getting those credentials into the container is where things go wrong.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Isolate Your AI Agents with uf sandbox — Containerized OpenCode Sessions via Podman</title><link>https://unboundforce.dev/blog/sandbox-isolation/</link><pubDate>Sun, 03 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://unboundforce.dev/blog/sandbox-isolation/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="the-problem"&gt;The Problem&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AI coding agents are powerful collaborators, but they run with the same filesystem access as any other process on your machine. When an agent executes a command, it is real — &lt;code&gt;rm -rf&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;git push --force&lt;/code&gt;, a corrupted &lt;code&gt;.git&lt;/code&gt; directory, a rewritten configuration file. The damage is immediate and often irreversible.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>